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Abstract: In this article I offer an explicating interpretation of 
the procedure of content recarving as described by Frege in §64 
of the Foundations of Arithmetic. I argue that the procedure of 
content recarving may be interpreted as an operation that while 
restricting the subject matter of a sentence, performs a 
generalization on what the sentence says about its subject matter. 
The characterization of the recarving operation is given in the 
setting of Yablo’s theory of subject matter and it is based on the 
relation of determination between properties. The main 
advantage of the proposal is its generality, for it is applicable not 
just to the case of abstraction principles. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In section 64 of the Foundations of Arithmetic (Frege, 
1950), Frege writes: 
 
The judgment ‘line a is parallel to line b’ [...] 
may be taken as an identity. If we do this, we 
obtain the concept of direction and say: ‘the 
direction of line a is identical with the 
direction of line b’. Thus we replace the 
symbol ǁ by the more generic symbol =, 
through removing what is specific in the 
content of the former and dividing it between 
a and b. We carve up the content in a way 
different from the original way and this yields 
us a new concept. 
 
This passage is of no secondary importance: it may be 
read as the justification for the fact that a statement asserting 
that a certain equivalence relation holds may be taken as an 
identity. A family of definitions may be seen as logically 
grounded in the procedure described in the quoted passage; 
using a terminology that probably Frege would not have 
endorsed, they have been labeled abstraction principles. One of 
the most interesting cases of abstraction principle is the 
implicit definition of the concept of cardinal number, also 
known as Hume’s Principle; it states that the sentence ‘there is 
a one-to-one correspondence between all instances of the 
concept F and those of the concept G’ may be taken as the 
identity ‘the cardinal number of the concept F is identical 
to the cardinal number of the concept G’. To highlight the 
similarity between the case of cardinal numbers and that of 
directions, note that the open sentence ‘there is a one-to-
one correspondence between all instances of the concept X 
and those of the concept Y ’ defines a higher-order 
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equivalence relation that, for sake of brevity, we will call 
equinumerousity. 
It has to be admitted: the passage in §64 is partially 
obscure. It is unclear what should be taken as the content of 
the symbol ‘∥ ’; moreover, it is even less clear how to intend 
the operation of removing what is specific in the content of 
this symbol and dividing it between a and b. 
The first step toward a satisfactory interpretation of the 
quoted passage is to make explicit the aspects of Frege’s 
procedure that are immediately understandable. Frege is 
implying that there may be different ways of carving up the 
same content, i.e. that the same content may be 
“organized” in different ways. Moreover, Frege is implying 
a special relation between (all?) carvings of the same 
content: the relation that holds whenever one carving is 
obtained by performing a certain re-conceptualization of 
another. The operation of removing part of the content of 
the relation of parallelism and distributing it between its 
relata may be seen as an example of the operation that 
converts a carving into another. I call this kind of operation 
content recarving. It is worth emphasizing that content 
recarving has been defined as a class of operations, i.e. the 
class including all operations that convert a carving into 
another; thus I am open to the possibility of there being 
procedures of recarving a content different from that 
described by Frege. Note that Frege is by no means 
implying that all carvings of the same content must be one 
the recarving of the other1. 
According to these remarks, a satisfactory analysis of 
Frege’s procedure must make sense of the notion of 
                                                     
1 The view that two sentences may be different carvings of the 
same content while not being one the recarving of the other is 
defended Yablo (2014) while considered as “incomprehensible” 
by Potter and Smiley (2001). 
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content, of the idea that the same content may be carved 
up in different ways, and provide a general account of the 
operation of content recarving. This paper aims at 
proposing such an analysis; my proposal consists in 
defining the content of a sentence φ as the proposition 
expressed by φ, the carving of a content as the specification of 
the exact subject matter of a certain sentence, and the 
operation of content recarving as subject matter restriction, 
where this restriction must be defined according to specific 
criteria.  Roughly speaking, the fundamental idea is that 
given a sentence φ and its subject matter m, the operation 
of content recarving consists in restricting the attention to 
the aspect of m which is the most relevant to ‘what φ says 
about m’. 
The semantic setting is the semantics of possible worlds, 
while the theoretical context is the account of the notion of 
subject matter given by Lewis (1988) and improved by 
Yablo (2014). The main theoretical advantages of the 
proposal are: 
 
1) a general theory of content recarving that does not 
apply just to abstraction principles;  
 
2) an explication of Frege’s idea that, by going far 
beyond the level of interpretation, allows for the 
evaluation of the philosophical consequences of the 
proposal in a context wider than that of Frege’s 
logicist project. 
 
In section 2 I will give a brief exposition of the theory 
of subject matter as proposed by Lewis and improved by 
Yablo; in section 3 I will give a rigorous definition of 
‘carving up a content’; in section 4 I attempt a first 
definition of ‘content recarving’ and I will present the main 
philosophical difficulty associated with this definition; in 
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section 5 I will improve the definition of section 4 and in 
section 6 I will give some conclusive remarks. 
 
 
2. LEWIS AND YABLO ON SUBJECT MATTER 
 
The most immediate account of the subject matter of a 
given sentence is given by Ryle (1933): a sentence S is about 
m iff S mentions m. However, this account suffers from 
several limitations: for instance, the sentence ‘Brazil has the 
largest tropical forest’ is about Brazil, but also about South 
America, even though South America is not explicitly 
mentioned. An improvement of Ryle’s proposal is 
Goodman’s account (Goodman, 1961): a sentence S is 
about m iff either m is mentioned by S or by one of S’s 
consequences. If Ryle’s account is too narrow, Goodman’s 
improvement seems to be too wide: the sentence ‘Brazil has 
the largest tropical forest or the Congress of Vienna started 
in 1814’ is about the Congress of Vienna and is a 
consequence of ‘Brazil has the largest tropical forest’: thus 
‘Brazil has the largest tropical forest’ is about the Congress 
of Vienna, which is evidently false. 
In (Lewis, 1988) a purely semantic account of subject 
matter is given: a subject matter is presented as some kind 
of “part” of a possible world. Two worlds w1 and w2 having 
a certain part p in common are indistinguishable whenever 
p is concerned, i.e. a sentence that is entirely about p cannot 
have different truth-values in w1 and w2
2. This remark leads 
                                                     
2 For sake of simplicity I speak of parts in common between 
possible worlds. This does not imply that the theory of subject 
matter presupposes world overlapping; the reader who thinks of 
world overlapping as untenable may replace ‘w1 and w2 have a 
part in common’ with ‘there is a part of w1 that is an intrinsic 
duplicate of a part of w2’. 
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Lewis to make a further step: two worlds that are 
indistinguishable with respect to a certain part p, stand in a 
certain equivalence relation associated with p; call this 
relation ≣p ; the introduction of this relation allows for the 
definition of a criterion for saying whether a certain 
sentence S is entirely about a certain world part p or not: S 
is about p iff for every two worlds w1, w2, if w1 ≣p w2, then 
the truth-value of S in w1 is identical to the truth-value of S 
in w2. 
This account of subject matter seems to be promising; 
however, as Yablo noted, it works only with parts-based 
subject matters. For instance, it is easy to see that the 
sentence ‘The congress of Vienna started in 1814’ as a 
sentence about 1814, and it also is easy to see that 1814 is a 
temporal part of a possible world. Similarly,  the sentence 
‘Brazil has the largest tropical forest’ is about Brazil, and 
there are no particular difficulties in considering Brazil as 
part of a possible world. Yet matters stand in a more 
complicate way with other examples: the sentence ‘There 
are n stars’ is supposedly about the number of stars in the 
universe and to say that the number of stars is a part of a 
possible world seems to be understandable only at the cost 
of substantially altering the meaning of the word ‘part’. As 
Yablo remarks, “Astronomers have not discovered a “star-
counter” part of the universe, such that worlds agree in 
how many stars they contain if and only if the one’s 
counter is an intrinsic duplicate of the other’s ”3. In other 
words, the number of stars is not a parts-based subject 
matter. Yablo’s solution to the difficulty is to generalize the 
notion of parts-based subject matter by introducing the 
notion of partitions-based subject matter. What does it 
mean to say that a subject-matter is partitions-based? 
Consider the case of the number of stars; surely we have no 
                                                     
3 (Yablo, 2014), p. 25 
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guarantees that there is a part of possible worlds that we 
may point at and say that it is the number   of stars. 
However, it is still possible to define an equivalence relation 
between worlds agreeing on how many stars there are. Let 
≣nos be this relation; we may apply Lewis’ criterion and say: 
a sentence S is wholly about the number of stars iff for any 
two worlds w1, w2, if w1 ≣nos w2, then the truth-value of S in 
w1 is identical to the truth-value of S in w2. 
Given that the number of stars seems to be a subject 
matter, what kind of entity is it qua subject matter? It 
cannot be a physical part of a world. At this point the shift 
from the notion of part to that of partition is crucial, for it 
allows for the needed generalization: the equivalence 
relation ≣nos divides the logical space into cells, i.e. it 
partitions the logical space, where each cell is composed of 
all possible worlds agreeing on how many stars there are. 
Thus we may identify the subject matter number of stars 
with the partitioning of the logical space defined by the 
equivalence relation ≣nos.  Clearly, if this generalization 
works well enough from a logical point view, it introduces 
an important distinction at the ontological level: when the 
theory was concerned only with parts-based subject matters 
we had no problem in identifying a certain subject matter 
with a certain entity existing in some possible worlds; 
nonetheless, when we introduce the notion of partitions-
based subject matters, an ontological distinction is needed, 
for now the subject matter 1814, i.e. the partition of the 
logical space including all worlds agreeing on what 
happened in 1814, no more coincides with the temporal 
part 1814. 
The theoretical move of generalizing the notion of part 
by introducing that of partition has the significant 
advantage of providing for all cases: whenever a way of 
partitioning the logical space is given according to a partial 
indistinguishability between worlds, a subject matter also is 
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given. And given a subject matter m, Lewis’ criterion for 
saying whether a certain sentence S is wholly about m is 
immediately applicable: if worlds belonging to the same m-
cell assign to S the same truth-value, then S is about m, 
otherwise it is not. In other words, S is about m iff the set 
of possible worlds in which S is true (false) is partitioned by 
m. 
The theory of partitions-based subject matters has 
another significant advantage: it allows for the definition of 
interesting relations between subject matters. For instance, 
it allows for the definition of the relation of inclusion of 
one subject matter into another, or, in different terms, it 
allows to say when a subject matter is smaller than another. 
Consider the case of 1814 as a subject matter: worlds 
agreeing on what happened in 1814 belong to the same cell. 
Intuitively, the subject matter XIX century includes the 
subject matter 1814, for the amount of information about 
the events occurred in the XIX century includes the 
information about the events that occurred on 1814; this 
intuition is confirmed by the theory. Indeed, worlds 
agreeing on what happened in the XIX century must agree 
on what happened on 1814 but the contrary does not hold. 
As a consequence, each 1814-partition must include a XIX 
century-partition as proper subset; generalizing this result 
we may say that the wider the subject matter, the finer the 
partitioning of the logical space. This conclusion is easily 
explainable: the wider the subject matter, the bigger the 
amount of information it conveys; the bigger the amount of 
conveyed information, the harder the agreement between 
two possible worlds ; the harder the agreement between 
possible worlds, the finer the partitioning of the logical 
space. 
The relation of ‘larger than’ or ‘smaller than’ applied to 
subject matters allows us to determine two extreme cases. 
Consider a sentence S; I will refer by the expression ‘S-
 Vincenzo Ciccarelli 9 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. 
partitioning’ to the way the sentence S partitions the logical 
space, i.e. the set of all possible worlds in which S is true 
and the set of possible worlds in which S is false. An 
extreme case is represented by the coarser subpartitioning 
of the S-partitioning, i.e. the S-partitioning itself (an 
improper subpartitioning). Call minS this subject matter: 
worlds agree on minS iff they agree on the truth-value of S. 
In other words, the subject matter minS is nothing but ‘the 
truth-value of S’ or ‘whether S is true or not’. Clearly S is 
about ‘whether S is true or not’, yet at the same time it 
seems to say something more. This because minS is the 
smallest subject matter on which S is about. Another 
extreme case is the one in which as subpartitioning of the 
S-partitioning we consider the one that divides the logical 
space into singleton cells. In this case no two worlds belong 
to the same cell, i.e. the subject matter is such that it is 
impossible for two worlds to agree on it. We may 
characterize this subject matter as ‘how the world is’: it is 
the largest subject matter. Clearly, S is about ‘how the 
world is’; yet at the same time it seems to say something 
less. The notion underlying these considerations is that of 
exact subject matter: S is exactly about m iff S is wholly 
concerned with m and it doesn’t care about anything else. 
We may say that the sentence S is exactly about a certain 
subject matter that lies in between the largest one and 
smallest one. For simplicity of exposition, I say that a 
sentence φ is genuinely about m iff m strictly lies between 
the largest and the smallest subject matter. The exact 
subject matter of a sentence φ is one of the genuine subject 
matters on which φ is about. 
Yablo introduces the notion of ways of being true (false) 
to define the grade of fineness of the subpartitioning 
associated with the exact subject matter of a certain 
sentence. “Sentential subject matter should be at most as 
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fine-grained as ways of being true”4 – he writes. To clarify 
the notion of ways of being true, it may help to refer to one 
of Yablo’s examples; consider the sentence: 
 
The U.S. president in 2001 is a senator’s son.  (φ) 
 
In the actual world wa the U.S. president in 2001 was 
Dubya, son of former senator George H.W. Bush; suppose 
that in a possible world w∗  different from wa, the U.S. 
president in 2001 was Al Gore, son of the former senator 
Albert Gore Sr. Both wa and w∗  make the sentence φ true, 
however there is a substantial difference between the ways 
in which φ obtains in the two worlds: there is a change in 
personnel, i.e. the U.S. president and his father are different 
persons. Let s be the subject matter of φ; Yablo writes: 
 
This is enough, it seems, to change the 
state of things where s is concerned. A 
transworld reporter on the φ beat could not 
plausibly claim that there was nothing to 
report – that it doesn’t matter, from a subject 
matter of φ perspective, who plays the two key 
roles. A change in personnel is more 
newsworthy than a change in the price of 
cotton. It is pretty clear why. The personnel 
change is a change in the individuals 
witnessing φ’s truth; a change in the witnesses 
affects how φ is true; and changes in how a 
sentence is true cannot be changes in an 
aspect of reality that φ is not even about. 
 
                                                     
4 (Yablo, 2014), p.41 
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My understanding of the passage is that ways of being 
true (false) of a sentence φ are univocally determined by the 
collection of the verifiers of φ, where by the word ‘verifier 
of φ’ I mean ‘what witnesses the truth of φ’; a sentence 
cannot be  true (false) in the same way in two different 
worlds in which is verified (falsified) by different entities. 
According to this preliminary consideration, we may 
identify the ways of being true or false of a sentence S with 
the part of the world that is determinant  for the 
assignment of the truth-value to S. Or, in different words, 
the part of a possible world that witnesses the truth-value 
of the sentence. For instance, the truth-value of ‘Socrates is 
wise’ is determined by the part of world corresponding to 
the individual Socrates; the truth-value of ‘There are no 
zombies’ is determined by the extension of the property ‘x 
is a zombie’ in a certain world: if this extension is empty 
than it corresponds to a way of being true, otherwise any 
possible non-empty extension of ‘x is a zombie’ 
corresponds to a way of being false. In the following, I will 
use the general term witness to denote indistinctly ways of 
being true or ways of being false of a certain sentence. 
Alternatively, I may use the expression verifier (falsifier) to 
denote the witness associated with a way of being true 
(false). 
 
Yablo’s proposal may be summed up by means of the 
following criterion: 
 
Exact aboutness 
The sentence φ is exactly about m iff 
 
• Worlds agreeing on the m-conditions also agree 
on the truth-value of φ, or, in other words, the subject 
matter m subpartitions the φ-partitioning. (Truth- value 
supervenience) 
 Content Recarving as Subject Matter Restriction  12 
Manuscrito – Rev. Int. Fil. Campinas, 2019. 
• There is at least one m-cell that is a proper subset of 
an φ-cell (Non-minimality) 
• There is at least one m-cell that is not a singleton 
(Non-maximality) 
• Each m-condition corresponds to a way of being 
true (false) of φ (where each way of being true 
corresponds to the list of verifiers (falsifiers) of φ in 
some possible worlds) 
 
In the next section all these notions will be used to define 
the carving of a content and the recarving operation. 
 
 
3. CARVING UP A CONTENT 
 
Frege’s account of the notion of content (Begriffinhalt) is 
not as clear as his account of other semantic notions, e.g. 
the germane notion of sense. This fact is easily explained if 
we take into account that he did not develop his mature 
theories on the ground of the notion of content; from 1884 
on, this notion was progressively abandoned. Frege himself 
seems to suggest that the notion was somehow confusedly 
presented: 
 
When I wrote my Foundations of Arithmetic, I 
had not yet made the distinction between 
sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung); and so, 
under the expression ‘the content of a possible 
judgement’, I was combining what I now 
designate by the distinctive words ‘thought’ 
(Gedanke) and ‘truth-value’ (Wahrheitswert). 
(Frege et al., 1951) 
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The combination of notions mentioned in the passage has 
lead several scholars to suppose that the notion of content was 
something in between sense and reference5; in particular, Hale 
(1997) proposes that the notion of content should be 
identified with what he calls weak sense; roughly speaking, weak 
sense is defined as some strong notion of truth-conditions 
which should stand for the state of affairs that a certain 
sentence describes. Though introducing an interesting 
perspective on the matter, this is not the position I take in this 
paper: I propose that two sentences are identical in content iff they have 
the same truth-value in all possible worlds. If the proposition 
expressed by a sentence is taken to be the set of possible 
worlds in which the sentence is true, a consequence of my 
proposal is the identification of contents with propositions. 
The view that any two logically equivalent sentences 
have the same content seems at odd with some aspects, 
consequences, and interpretations of Frege’s view: 
 
 Suppose that all necessary truths have the same 
content; yet if all theorems of arithmetic share the 
same content with all theorems of logic, how truths 
arithmetic may be informative without presenting 
any addition of content to truths of logic?6 
 
 There seems to be a certain relation of relevance 
between the two sides of an abstraction principle; 
however, there are many cases of logically equivalent 
sentences that do not present any relevance at all. 
                                                     
5 (Hale, 1997), (Dummett, 1991) 
6 A similar remark is made by M. Kremer in his essay included in 
(Ricketts and Potter, 2010), p.220–293. 
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Thus identity of content should be a relation 
stronger than logical equivalence7. 
The first line of thought is based on the assumption that 
informativeness is characterized in terms of a difference in 
content, in particular, in terms of a certain surplus of 
content. I don’t have an argument to reject this view; my 
only remark is that informativeness is an epistemic notion 
while content is not. Thus informativeness may be 
characterized in terms of the way a certain content is 
accessed and not in terms of content itself: for instance, a 
certain logical equivalence α ≡ β may  be informative in 
virtue of the fact that the same content is presented in 
different ways and not in virtue of a difference in content 
between α and β. 
The second point is raising a more fundamental 
objection to the identification of the content of a sentence 
with the proposition it expresses.  My reply is that  as far as 
the main purpose of the analysis is not merely exegetic, the 
difficulty is mainly terminological. Once the interpretation 
of Frege’s notion of content is not a priority, what matters 
is the characterization of the relation of relevance holding 
between the two sides of an abstraction principle; according 
to my proposal, this is a relation that holds between some 
special carvings of a certain content: call this family of 
carvings related carvings; according to what may be called 
the fine grained content approach, the relation of relevance 
holds between two sentences  in virtue of the fact that they 
are carvings of the same content. Suppose now  that there 
is a valid argument to the effect that Frege’s notion of 
content should not be identified with that of proposition: 
once the relation of relevance has been satisfactorily 
characterized, one may decide to simply call ‘proposition’ 
what I call ‘content’ and to say that two sentences are 
                                                     
7 I attribute this position to Hale (1997). 
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identical in content whenever I say that they are related 
carvings8. On the other hand, the identification of content 
with proposition allows me to discuss the issue within a 
better understood theoretical setting; this may result in an 
interpretation of the notion of carving and recarving easily 
understandable also outside of the context of Frege’s 
project. 
 
I will now introduce the needed definitions to formulate my 
proposal. Let W be the class of all possible worlds; I will 
assume that W is associated with a certain interpretation of a 
certain language. I define the bilateral proposition expressed by a 
sentence φ – denoted by      |φ| – in the following way: 
 
|φ| =  ⟨  |φ|T , |φ|F⟩        (1) 
 
where |φ|T  (|φ|F  ) stands for the set of possible worlds 
in which φ is true (false). I take the content of φ to be the 
bilateral proposition expressed by φ. Thus, the content of a 
sentence is something very close to its truth-value, or, in 
different words, is a minimal notion of truth-conditions of 
a sentence, i.e. what is commonly known as the intension of 
the sentence9. In a preliminary way, I may say that the 
content of a sentence φ conveys no more information than 
the truth-table of φ. 
                                                     
8 When the operation of recarving will be defined, instead of 
using the expression ‘related carvings’ I will say that two 
sentences are one the recarving of the other. 
9 Hale (1997) also identifies content and truth-conditions, yet he 
seems to have in mind a more refined notion of truth-conditions; 
for this reason I use the adjective ‘minimal’ to characterize the 
notion of truth-table-like truth-conditions. 
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Even if the content of a sentence has been characterized 
in purely extensional terms, there are different ways of 
understanding the given definition. For instance, for the 
purpose of the following exposition, the content of a 
sentence S may be conceived as the characteristic function 
associated with S, i.e. the function that returns the value 
‘True’ when applied to a world according to which S is true, 
the value ‘False’ otherwise. When the content is thus 
understood, I will also speak of the content as a condition on 
possible worlds, where the word ‘condition’ has to be 
intended in its extensional sense, i.e. as a characteristic 
function. Given a sentence S, the condition associated with 
the content of S may be determined by the expression ‘the 
world w is such that the sentence S is true’. 
Albeit the given definition of content may result very 
simple, it becomes problematic when the task of defining 
the carvings of a content is considered. Indeed, there is no 
immediate sense we may give to the expression ‘carving up 
an ordered pair of sets of possible worlds in different ways’. 
Even if we assume that to carve up a set is to divide it into 
proper subsets, sets give us no hint in how they should be 
divided. More specifically, we may allow decompositions of 
each set A, B composing the content  ⟨  A , B ⟩  into proper 
subsets as carvings; however there are three main 
difficulties related to this approach: 1) Given a content  ⟨  A 
, B ⟩  it must be clarified what is the condition that 
determines a certain decomposition; 2) it is not clear what 
such decomposition should mean 3) it is even less clear 
what a decomposition of sets into proper subsets has to do 
with the description of Frege’s procedure. My claim is that 
these difficulties may be overcome by applying Lewis-
Yablo theory of subject matter to the notion of content 
carving as preliminary understood. 
It has been said that a certain content may be associated 
with a certain condition on possible worlds. Consider now 
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the sentence φ being ‘Madison Ave is parallel to the 5th 
Avenue’  and let c be its content;  for each possible world w,     
c tells us whether w makes φ true or not; consider now the 
way c seems to be carved up by φ: for each possible world 
w, it is said whether two constituents of w, i.e. Madison Ave 
and the 5th Avenue, are brought together in such a way that φ 
is true or not. This simple consideration shows that a 
carving of a content may be seen as the conversion of a 
condition on worlds into a new condition applied to world-
constituents (or, to be general, to some specific aspects of a 
world) . In other words, while the content c tells us whether a 
world w meets a certain requirement R or not, a carving of c 
tells us how a world w meets R. 
According to the given definition, the content of a 
sentence φ distinguishes between worlds that make φ true 
and worlds that make φ false. The way φ carves up this 
content traces a finer distinction: among worlds that makes 
φ true (false) it distinguishes worlds that make φ true (false) 
in different ways. In other words, a content partitions the 
logical space into the region of truth and that of falsity, 
while a carving of a content partitions the logical space into 
ways of being true and ways of being false. This takes us to 
the notion of exact subject matter: a sentence φ carves up its 
content c according to what φ is exactly about. More precisely, φ 
partitions the region of truth (falsity) of c into sub-cells univocally 
associated with φ’s ways of being true (false). 
I have previously mentioned that to carve up the 
content of a sentence S  is  to convert the condition on 
possible worlds determined by S into a condition on world-
constituents, where the word ‘condition’ in the first 
occurrence has to be intended in an extensional sense, i.e as 
the characteristic function of the sentence (or, in Carnap’s 
terminology, intension). How the word ‘condition’ should 
be understood when applied to world constituents? We may 
define also this new condition as an extensional truth 
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function. Let S be a sentence and m the exact subject matter 
of S. As Yablo himself suggests, we may conceive the subject 
matter m as a function that given a possible world w returns 
the witness of S in w. For instance, given that the sentence 
‘Socrates is wise’ is exactly about Socrates, the function m 
associates to every possible world w the extension of the 
proper name ‘Socrates’ in the world w. Hence we may 
define the condition introduced in the informal definition 
of content carving as a function – say it FS – defined over 
all witnesses and having the set of truth-values as co-
domain. More precisely, given a witness A, FS (A) is the 
value ‘True’ if all worlds agreeing that the value of m is A 
makes the sentence S true, otherwise FS (A) is the value 
‘False’. 
According to the previous remarks, we may consider a 
carving of a certain content c of a sentence φ as the 
specification of the exact subject matter of φ, or, as a 
subpartitioning of c according to the ways of being true and 
the ways of being false of the sentence φ. This definition 
may be easily formalized: 
 
Content Carving (CC) 
Let ≡φT
 
(≡φF
 
) be the relation that holds between two possible 
worlds whenever φ is true (false) in the same way in them; 
let χ (φ) denote ‘the way φ carves up its content’; according 
to the given considerations: 
 
 
χ (φ)=  ⟨  |φ|T/ ≡φT
 
 
, |φ|F/ ≡φF
 ⟩   (2) 
 
where  |φ|T/ ≡φT  stands for the quotient set of  |φ|T with 
respect to the equivalence relation ≡φ
T
 
. 
Given that all logically equivalent sentences have the 
same content, yet they may have different exact subject 
matters, there may be different carvings of the same 
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content. One may ask if there is a purely extensional 
criterion that given the content c of a certain sentence, 
allows us to determine all possible carvings of c; we may 
attempt the following definition: 
 
Criterion for content carving (CCC) 
Let ⟨   A , B ⟩  be a content; the pair  ⟨  K , H ⟩  is a 
carving of  ⟨  A , B ⟩ , in symbols: 
 
Γ( ⟨  A , B ⟩ ,  ⟨   K , H ⟩ ) 
 
iff the following conditions obtain: 
(i) ∪ K  = A   &   ∪ H = B 
(ii) ∀ x ∈  K (x ⊂  A  &  x ≠ ∅ ) 
(iii) ∀ x ∈  H (x ⊂  B & x ≠ ∅ ) 
(iv) ∃ x ∈  (K ∪  H) ∃ u, v ∈  x (u ≠ v) 
(v) ∀ u, v ∈  (K ∪  H) (u ≠ v  ⇒   u ∩ v = ∅ ) 
. . . 
 
Conditions (i)-(v) ensure that the set K (H) is a 
decomposition of A (B) into cells such that all K-cells (H-
cells) are non-empty proper pairwise disjointed subsets of 
A (B) and at least one element of K  or H  is not a 
singleton.   According to   the notions introduced in the 
previous section, conditions (i)-(v) ensure that the 
partitioning represented by  ⟨  K , H ⟩  is associated with a 
genuine subject matter of the bilateral proposition  ⟨  A , B 
⟩ . 
To see (CCC) as defining a carving is to assume that every 
genuine subject matter of a certain bilateral proposition is 
the exact subject matter of some sentence. This seems to be 
too strong: it implies that every combinatorially possible 
partitioning of a content satisfying conditions (i)-(v) defines 
a class of ways of being true (false), i.e. defines a class of 
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possible verifiers (falsifiers). Under the assumption that a 
verifier v is an entity which exists in all worlds in which the 
sentence that it verifies is true in the way associated with v, 
(CCC) implies a form of ontological inflationism. For we 
may introduce new entities with extreme liberty: it suffices 
only to partition a certain content in the suitable way 
defined by (i)-(v). 
This consequence is highly undesirable; for now I say 
that not all combinatorially possible “re-partitionings” that 
satisfy condition (i)-(v) are to be considered as carvings of 
the given content. In section 5 I will attempt to characterize 
this restriction. 
As previously suggested, from definition (2) it follows 
that two sentences are different ways of carving up the same 
content iff they are logically equivalent and they have 
different exact subject matters. Take the case of lines and 
directions: the sentence ‘In the city X, the street of the 
bakery is parallel to the street of the library ’10
 
is exactly 
about the street of the bakery and the street of the library in 
the city X11, whereas the sentence ‘In the city X, the 
direction of the street of the bakery is identical to the 
direction of the street of the library’ is about different 
                                                     
10 Assume that in the city X there is only one bakery and only one 
library. 
11 Firstly, note that worlds agreeing on which streets the street of 
the bakery and the street of the library are, must agree on whether 
they are parallel or not. Moreover, recall Yablo’s remark on the 
sentence ‘The U.S. president in 2001 is a senator’s son‘: a change 
in the entities with which a certain subject matter is concerned 
must imply a change in the way the sentence is true. Thus, a 
transworld change in the streets for which ‘the street of the 
bakery’ and ‘the street of the library’ stand that maintains them 
parallel, is a change of the way the sentence asserting their 
parallelism is true. 
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things, i.e. directions (supposing for simplicity that the 
existence of directions is uncontroversial). To see the 
difference, note that two possible worlds may agree on the 
common direction of the street of the bakery and the street 
of the library (for instance they may agree that the two 
streets form a certain angle θ with the north-south axis) 
while disagreeing in which street the bakery or the library is 
(the two streets may be different from a world to another 
while maintaining the same direction). Moreover, it is 
impossible that there are two worlds assigning the same 
direction to the streets and different truth-value to the 
sentence asserting the identity of these directions, thus 
directions are a genuine subject matter of the considered 
sentence. Moreover, it seems to be absurd to allow the 
sentence  to be true (false) in the same way when the 
directions of the considered streets has changed from one 
world to another; thus the sentence is exactly about the 
direction of the street of the bakery and the direction of the 
street of the library. 
I hope to have successfully showed how to overcome 
two of the three difficulties related to the notion of carving 
when applied to a set theoretic definition of content. The 
first difficulty was related to the determination of the 
conditions that decompose a set into proper subsets, the 
second to the requirement of a meaningful interpretation of 
such a decomposition. According to my proposal, given a 
sentence φ , the true (false) region of the logical space is 
partitioned according to φ’s ways of being true (false); thus 
ways of being true (false) represent the condition for 
decomposing the true (false) region into proper subsets. It 
has been shown that this decomposition is associated with a 
philosophically significant notion, i.e. the notion of exact 
subject matter. There is still a third difficulty, i.e. the relation 
between the proposed decomposition and Frege’s 
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procedure; it will be solved in the next section, when the 
operation of content recarving will be defined. 
Given the identification of the content of a sentence 
with its minimal truth- conditions, an interesting question 
would be whether the carving of a certain content may be 
identified with a certain notion of refined truth-conditions. The 
answer is positive: it suffices to see that the operation of 
carving up a content consists in the transformation of a 
condition on worlds into a new condition on the specific 
aspect of worlds which is determinant for the truth-value. 
Thus by carving up the content of a sentence φ we pass 
from a “brute expression of the truth-conditions” to a more 
refined version, in which we specify some 
constituents/aspects of a possible world that brought 
together in a suitable way make φ true. 
One may object that my proposal on content carving 
does not take into account another aspect of the preliminary 
understanding of the notion: the logical form. Indeed, one 
may understand the fact that two sentences are different 
ways of carving up the same content as the fact that they are 
logically equivalent sentences having different logical forms. 
An immediate reply to the objection would be that the 
language in which the sentences are expressed must be 
regimented in such a way that a difference in subject matter 
is a necessary and sufficient condition for a difference in 
logical form. Yet this is impossible; consider the sentence φ 
and the sentence φ ∧  (φ ∨  ¬φ) and assume that φ is exactly 
about m: both φ and φ ∧  (φ ∨  ¬φ) are exactly about m 
while having different logical forms. Thus to assume that a 
logical form picks out a unique carving of a certain content 
is in contrast with the definitions given in this section. 
I don’t have a definitive argument to the effect that a 
syntactic criterion for carving distinction in terms of logical 
form is less satisfactory than a semantic one in terms of 
subject matter. To my mind, when the notion of content 
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carving is concerned, the notion of logical form is 
interesting insofar as it provides information about the way 
truth-conditions are satisfied. On this aspect, the sentence φ 
∧  (φ ∨  ¬φ) does nothing more than φ, for the conjunct  φ 
∨  ¬φ does not even contribute to the determination of the 
truth-value of φ. 
In conclusion, I remark that given a certain carving, i.e. 
given a certain refined expression of the truth-conditions of 
a sentence, there are logical forms that naturally correspond 
to this expression (as in the example of parallelism and 
identity of directions) and logical forms that expresses the 
same refined truth-conditions in a very roundabout way (as 
in the example of the previous paragraph). According to my 
proposal, the latter cases collapse into the former ones, for 
less natural cases of logical form fail to specify a different 
exact subject matter12. As a consequence, my notion of 
content carving is insensitive to artificial syntactic 
constructions that are not determinant for the assignment 
of truth-value. In this sense, my account is less dependent 
on language than the view according to which each logical 
form is univocally associated with a carving. 
 
 
4. CONTENT RECARVING 
 
In this section the part of Frege’s procedure labeled 
‘content recarving’ will be analyzed and defined. We will 
start by highlighting some similarities between the operation 
of carving up a content and that of recarving a content 
already carved up in a certain way. 
                                                     
12 A different and equally interesting approach to the matter is 
Yablo distinction between invited and uninvited recarvings, (Yablo, 
2008). 
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Consider Frege’s example: it has been said that the sentence 
‘a ∥  b’ carves up its content according to what it is exactly 
about, i.e. lines a and b; more specifically, the carving 
associated with ‘a ∥  b’ is the transformation of a condition 
on worlds into a new condition – determined by the 
relation of parallelism – on relevant constituents of worlds, 
i.e. the lines for which the expressions ‘a’ and ‘b’ respectively 
stand. In this way, we refine the given truth-conditions by 
focusing on a specific aspect of a world and not on a world 
in its entirety. We may conceive content recarving as a 
similar operation: we transform a condition on some 
constituents of a world into a new condition on some more 
relevant aspect of these constituents. For instance, we 
transform the condition of parallelism between lines into 
a new condition, i.e. identity, applied to an aspect of lines, 
i.e. directions, that is the most relevant when parallelism is 
concerned. These considerations may be taken to go 
toward the fundamental idea of my proposal: the operation 
of content recarving is an operation of restriction of a 
certain subject matter. 
The similarity between carving and recarving may 
illuminate further aspects of Frege’s procedure: the 
restriction of our attention on a relevant aspect of lines may 
be seen as the result of applying the specific part of the 
content of the relation of parallelism to its relata; the new 
conditions obtained over directions may be seen as the 
result of removing the specific part of the content of the 
original condition. These two aspects are in some sense 
complementary: when we restrict our attention on a specific 
aspect of lines we automatically make the condition applied 
to lines more general, i.e. we transform it into an identity. 
This fact may be spelled out as follows: an equivalence 
relation R may be seen as a partial identity: in fact, every 
equivalence relation defines a class of invariant properties, i.e. 
all properties that two object that are R-related have in 
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common. As a consequence, two objects are R-related iff 
they have all the R-invariant properties in common. This 
may be seen as a restricted version of Leibniz’s law: 
whenever two objects shares all properties that are in a 
certain class ∆, they are partial identical (or identical with 
respect to ∆). According to this reading of an equivalence 
relation, what is specific of the content of R is the class of 
invariant properties it defines; and all invariant properties 
characterize the aspect of the relata that is relevant to the 
equivalence relation. Thus to remove what is specific in the 
content R is to convert a partial identity into a total identity, 
and to apply what is specific of R to a and b is to pick out 
the aspect of a and b associated their R-invariant properties. 
In the case of lines, we may say that the concept of 
direction is determined by the class of all orientational 
properties defined by the relation of parallelism; in the case 
of concepts, the concept of cardinal number is determined 
by the class of quantitative properties associated with the 
relation of equinumerousity. 
One may object that the previous explanation does not 
help to understand the operation of content recarving 
insofar as it lacks generality, for it is relevant just to the case 
of abstraction principles. Though the objection is correct, it 
is possible to extrapolate a pattern of explanation that apply 
to all cases. To this end, consider the following example of 
content recarving: 
let φ be the sentence ‘The U.S. president in 2017 is blond 
(blonde)’; it is exactly about the U.S. president in 2017. We 
may recarve this content by restricting the subject matter the 
U.S. president in 2017 and obtain the hair color of the U.S. 
president in 2017 ; if we do this, we obtain the sentence ψ: 
‘The hair color of the U.S. president in 2017 is in the rang 
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of yellow’13. It is easy to see that the new sentence is exactly 
about the hair color of the U.S. president; it can also be 
shown that the hair color of the U.S. president in 2017 is a 
subject matter strictly included in the U.S. president in 2017, 
for all worlds wholly agreeing on who’s the U.S. president 
in 2017 must agree on his/her hair color, yet not all worlds 
agreeing on the hair color of the U.S. president in 2017 also 
agree on who’s the president. As a result of such a subject 
matter restriction, the condition ‘x is blond (blonde)’ has 
now been generalized so that the condition ‘x is in the 
range of yellow’ obtains; to be blond (blonde) is a property 
that concerns the color of a specific part of a person, while 
to be in the range of yellow applies to all object having a 
defined color. 
There is a general way to present this fact. Given a 
sentence φ, we may always distinguish between the subject 
matter of φ and what φ says about its subject matter. Let ψ be 
a sentence that recarves the content of φ by restricting the 
subject matter m of φ in such a way that a new smaller 
subject matter n obtains. Consider now an n-cell A 
associated with a certain witness a of ψ. Given that n is 
strictly included in m, there is always an n-cell that may be 
seen as obtained by merging some (at least two) m-cells. 
Suppose that the n-cell A is the result of merging the m-
cells B1, B2, and B3 to which the witnesses of φ b1, b2, and b3 
are associated. The fact that what ψ says about n is more 
general than what φ says about m may be explained thus: we 
may describe a certain circumstance in which ψ is true by 
saying that a is compatible with what ψ says about n; this 
very circumstance corresponds to three different 
circumstances in which φ is true, viz. the circumstances in 
which either b1 or b2 or b3 is compatible with what φ says 
                                                     
13 Assuming that it is a necessary truth that whenever someone is 
blonde her hair color is in the range of yellow. 
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about m. Therefore what ψ says about n is more general 
because with a single condition of compatibility it captures 
a multiplicity of circumstances in which what φ says about 
m is the case. Or, in different terms, for an object a to be 
compatible with what ψ says about n less is required from a 
possible world than what is required for b1 (b2 or b3) to be 
compatible with what φ says about m. 
Thus content recarving may be conceived as a content 
preserving operation that by making more specific one 
aspect of the content (i.e.  the subject matter   of the given 
sentence) has to make more general the other (i.e. what the 
given sentence says about its subject matter). These two 
aspects of the same operation may be associated with the 
two steps of Frege’s procedure: the determination of a 
more specific subject matter may be associated with the 
division of the specific content of the relation of parallelism 
between the two lines; the operation of removing the 
specific content of the relation of parallelism may be 
associated with the generalization of the condition applied 
to the original subject matter. 
Having clarified the general idea of content recarving, it 
is possible to formulate a rigorous definition: 
 
Content recarving (CR) 
 
Let φ and ψ be sentences; let χ(φ) and χ(ψ) be the 
respective carvings; we say that χ(ψ) is obtained by 
recarving χ(φ), in symbols 
 
 
Θ(χ(ψ), χ(φ)) 
 
iff 
 
(i) |φ| = |ψ| 
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(ii)  ∀x ∈  (|φ|T/≡Tφ  ∪ |φ|F/≡Fφ) ∀ y ∈  (|ψ|T/≡Tφ  ∪  
|ψ|F/≡Fφ), (x ⊆  y  ∨   x ∩ y = ∅ )   
 
(iii)  ∃ x ∈  (|φ|T/≡Tφ  ∪ |φ|F/≡Fφ) ∃ y ∈  (|ψ|T/≡Tφ  ∪ 
|ψ|F/≡Fφ), (x ⊂  y) 
 
Some remarks on the given definition. Firstly, the 
formula Θ(ξ, ζ) has the metavariables ξ and ζ ranging over 
carvings, yet it may also be read as a relation between 
sentences, by defining  
 
Θ∗ (ψ, φ) ⇔ Θ(χ(ψ), χ(φ))  
 
for this reason we may simply say that ψ is a recarving of 
φ whenever the way ψ carves up its content is obtained by 
recarving the way φ carves up its content. The definition 
(CR) says that ψ is a recarving of φ whenever φ and ψ are 
logically equivalent and the exact subject matter of ψ is 
strictly included in the exact subject matter of φ. By simple 
set theoretic considerations it is possible to conclude that Θ 
is a partial strict order, i.e. it is an anti-reflexive, anti-
symmetric,  and transitive relation.  It is interesting to see 
that Θ is not connected, i.e. there are carvings of the same 
content such that none is the recarving of the other. This is 
explained by the fact that there may be logically equivalent 
sentences whose subject matters are not in a relation of 
inclusion, for instance in the case that the intersection 
between a cell of one subject matter is non-empty and 
different from a cell of the other subject matter. This result 
is in line with one aspect of our preliminary understanding 
of the notion of content recarving: for ψ to be a recarving 
of φ, a certain relation of relevance between φ and ψ is 
expected: my proposal rigorously defines such a relation of 
relevance as strict inclusion of subject matter. 
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From a set theoretic point of view, (CR) provides an 
interesting characterization of the relation of recarving 
conceived as an operation. Let m be the exact subject 
matter of a certain sentence, and n the subject matter 
resulting from the recarving. Clearly, n is strictly included in 
m; by definition of subject matter inclusion, every m-cell is a 
subset of every n-cell with at least one m-cell being proper 
subset of one n-cell. As a consequence, the restriction of 
subject matter associated with content recarving may be 
seen as performed by merging some m-cells to obtain the n-
cells. 
Content recarving has been defined as a relation 
between carved contents; the previous remark suggests that 
it may also be conceived as an operation performed on a 
carving, provided that the new restricted subject matter is 
given in advance. Let φ be a sentence and m a subject 
matter; denote by [φ] the subject matter of  φ; the operation 
of recarving according to the subject matter m, in symbols 
Θm is defined as follows:  
 
Θm(χ(φ)) =  ⟨   K , H ⟩   
 
iff 
 
(i) m < [φ] 
(ii) Γ(|φ|,  ⟨  K , H ⟩)  
(iii) K =|φ|T/≡m    &   H =|φ|F/≡m 
 
 
where the expression ‘m < [φ]’ stands for ‘the subject 
matter m is strictly included in the subject matter of φ’, the 
relation Γ is the one defined in (CCC), and ‘≡m’ stands for 
the equivalence relation associated with the subject matter 
m (i.e. the relation that holds between two worlds whenever 
they are indistinguishable with respect to m). 
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Given a subject matter m, the result of the 
operation Θm may not be the carving of a defined 
sentence but just a hypothetical carving. This because 
nothing ensures that the cells in K (H) correspond to 
ways of being true (false) of a certain sentence; in 
other words, we have no guarantee that what is 
indistinguishable between worlds belonging to the 
same cell in K (H) is an existing witness of some 
sentence ψ. This leads to fundamental semantic and 
metaphysical issues related to the notion of content 
recarving: the discussion on these aspects of the 
notion will be the focus of the next section. 
 
 
5. RECARVING AT THE JOINTS 
 
The account of the operation of content recarving given so 
far left unanswered some fundamental questions on the 
matter: when the result of a recarving obtained by a mere 
merging of partitions effectively corresponds to a new 
subject matter of a new sentence? What is the ontological 
import of such an operation? 
These questions point at the problem of distinguishing 
between merely hypothetical carvings, i.e. carvings obtained 
by a mere set theoretic procedure, and effective carvings, 
i.e. carvings that besides being the result of a certain 
merging also present some kind of connection with the 
metaphysical structure of reality. To trace this distinction two 
problems must be solved: 1) the problem of the 
determination of the new restricted subject matter 
associated with a recarving operation; 2) the problem of 
establishing the ontological import of the new ways 
of being true (false) of the new sentence exactly 
about the restricted subject matter. For instance, in the 
case of Frege’s example, the solution of the first problem 
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would be the answer to the question “why directions?” and 
the solution of the second problem would be the answer to 
the question “Given that we may restrict the subject matter 
line a, line b to direction of a, direction of b , on what grounds we 
may say that directions exist? ”. In the following part of this 
section I will propose a sketch of a solution to the first 
problem (determination of the new subject matter); 
regarding the second issue, I will limit myself to specify in 
which terms the problem may be formulated without 
disputing the details. 
Given a sentence φ, φ carves up its content according to 
its exact subject matter; for instance, the subject matter U.S. 
president in 2017 divides the logical space into cells each of 
which is associated with a certain individual. There is a huge 
variety of possible ways of merging these cells in order to 
obtain a coarser partitioning of the logical space; however, 
many of them are merely arbitrary insofar as they are just 
the result of set theoretic operations. If we want a guiding 
criterion that tells us which cell should be merged with 
which, then we need a certain pattern of resemblances between 
the ways the sentence whose content is to be recarved is 
true (false);  and it is reasonable to assume that such a 
pattern of resemblances  is given by a battery of necessary 
truths related to the subject matter at issue.  For instance, 
given the subject matter U.S. president in 2017, consider the 
cell associated with the actual Donald Trump (i.e. the set of 
worlds in which the actual Donald Trump is the U.S. 
president in 2017) and that associated with the actual Hilary 
Clinton. If we want to merge the Trump-cell with the 
Clinton-cell, we should do this on the ground of a certain 
resemblance between Clinton and Trump that instantiates a 
certain general pattern of resemblances between U.S. 
presidents in 2017; given that the required relation of 
resemblance has to do with entities of different possible 
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worlds, it depends on a certain class of necessary truths 
about 
U.S. presidents in 2017 (for instance the set of truths 
analytic of the concept of U.S. president or of the concept of 
person). However, not any sort of resemblance may serve 
our purpose: the specific resemblance between Clinton and 
Trump must be relevant to what the original sentence (i.e. 
the sentence to be recarved) says about the subject matter 
U.S. president in 2017 ; for example, if the sentence is ‘The 
U.S. president in 2017 is blond/blonde’, then the Clinton-
cell and the Trump-cell may be merged iff there is a relation 
between Clinton and Trump that instantiates a pattern of 
resemblances with respect to blondness. 
The goal of determining the new subject matter 
resulting from the recarving may be achieved in two steps: 
firstly, a criterion for saying when a certain partitioning of 
the logical space corresponds to an effective subject matter, 
i.e. a partitioning of the logical space such that all worlds 
belonging to the same cell must have something in 
common, in the sense of being indistinguishable under a 
certain respect; secondly, once the aforementioned pattern 
of resemblances has been defined, it must be shown that 
the new subject matter determined by the pattern of 
resemblances is a subject matter satisfying the criterion of 
effectiveness of the previous point. As it turns out, both 
the criterion of effectiveness and the definition of the 
pattern of resemblances are based on the same notion: the 
relation between a determinable property and its determinate 
properties. 
The relation determinable-determinates may be briefly 
described as a particular kind of specification relation: ‘red’ 
(i.e. the determinate) is a specifier of ‘colored’ (i.e. the 
determinable), ‘having 2 kg of mass’ is a specifier of ‘having 
mass’, ‘having a length of two meters’ is a specifier of 
‘having a length’ etc. Intuitively, each cell in which a subject 
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matter divides the logical space seems to be a specifier of the 
same sort: consider the subject matter ‘The US president in 
2017’; it partitions the set of worlds according to which 
there is a US president in 2017. Thus we may see this set as 
the extension of the determinable property ‘w is a world 
according to which there is a US president in 2017’. 
Correspondingly, each cell is the extension of a certain 
determinate: for instance, the cell including all worlds 
according to which the US president in 2017 is the actual 
Donald Trump may be seen as the extension of the 
property ‘w is a world according to which the actual Donald 
Trump is the US president in 2017’. 
The fundamental idea is to take the relation 
determinate-determinable as a characteristic feature of 
effective subject matters, i.e. of subject matters that are not 
just the result of a mere set theoretic operation of 
partitioning. Yet to do this, we need a criterion for saying 
when a class of properties may be considered the 
determinates of a certain determinable. 
According to the relevant literature, the fundamental 
features that characterize the relation determinate-
determinables are the following: 
 
i. (Exclusiveness) If Q and M are determinates of P , 
then no object having P may have both Q and M 
((Johnson, 2014), (Prior, 1949)) 
ii. (Non-conjunctive) If Q is a determinate of P , then 
Q is a non-conjunctive specifier of P and it is 
logically related to any non-conjunctive specifier of P 
, where two properties are logically related whenever 
either one entails the other or one entails the 
negation of the other (Körner and Searle, 1959) 
iii. (Modal constraint ) If Q is a determinate of P , then 
necessarily to have Q entails to have P and possibly 
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am object may have P without having Q. (Yablo, 
1992) 
iv. (Levels) There possibly are many levels of 
specification of P , each level corresponding to a 
different class of determinates of P ; every 
determinate of P of a certain level is a determinable 
with respect to a certain class of determinates of P of 
the next level.((Johnson, 2014), (Prior, 1949)) 
 
To understand how these four conditions apply, consider 
the most common example of the relation of determination, 
i.e. the one holding between a particular color property and 
the property of being colored. (Exclusiveness) is satisfied, for 
no object may have two different colors at the same time. 
To understand (Non- conjunctive) we need to spell out the 
notion of ‘non-conjunctive specifier’; for instance, the 
property of being human is a specifier of the property of 
being animal, for not all animals are humans. However, 
human is a conjunctive specifier, for there is a property not 
necessarily co-extensional with human, i.e. rational, such 
that the conjunction of this property with the property of 
being an animal is co-extensional with the property of being 
a human. It is easy to see that ‘x is red’ cannot be defined as 
the conjunction of ‘x is colored’ and some other property 
not co-extensional with ‘x is red’. In other words, the 
relation between a determinable and a correspondent 
determinate does not reduce to the relation between genus 
and specie. Moreover, given any other non-conjunctive 
specifier of ‘x is colored’, for instance ‘x is yellow’, ‘x is red’ 
implies that ‘x is not yellow’. (Modal constraint ) is easy to 
understand: necessarily, if something is red, then it must be 
colored, yet something might be colored without being red. 
(Levels) is one of the most interesting feature: ‘x is red’ is a 
determinate of ‘x is colored’ while it is a determinable with 
respect to the determinate ‘x is scarlet’. 
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What the relation of determination has to do with the 
notion of subject matter? I will not propose a general 
argument to the effect that the existence of a relation of 
determination between properties of possible worlds is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the effectiveness of a 
subject matter; nonetheless, I will try to convince the reader 
that this is the case by referring to some examples. 
Consider the subject matter ‘The US president in 2017’. 
It is an effective subject matter, for worlds agreeing on the 
US president in 2017 do have something in common: they 
are partially indistinguishable, i.e. indistinguishable with 
respect to the US president in 2017. We will show that for 
every X such that X is a possible US president in 2017 , the 
cell associated with X is a determinate of the determinable 
property ‘w is a world according to which there is a US 
president in 2017’. Firstly, note that no world may admit 
both the actual Donald Trump and the actual Hilary Clinton 
as US presidents, which proves that (Exclusiveness) holds14. 
Regarding (Non-conjunctive), it is hard to imagine how the 
property ‘w is a world according to which the actual Donald 
Trump is the US president in 2017’ may be defined by 
putting the property ‘w is a world according to which there 
is a US president in 2017’ in conjunction with another 
property not co-extensional with the former. Indeed, it 
                                                     
14  One may disagree by supposing that there is a possible world 
in which the United States in 2017 have adopted a sort of 
duumvirate, thus admitting two presidents. Yablo himself 
((Yablo, 2014), p.36) recognizes the possibility of subject matters 
that are not defined by an equivalence relation due to the lack of 
transitivity, as in this case. For sake of simplicity, I will not 
consider this sort of subject matters in the present discussion; it is 
as if the operation of recarving may be  applied only to subject 
matter that are in good order, i.e. that partitions the logical space 
into disjointed cells. 
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seems that such property may be defined by the 
conjunction of all properties of the sort ‘w is a world 
according to which the US president in 2017 is F ’ with F 
intrinsic property of the actual Donald Trump; yet this 
conjunctive property is co-extensional to ‘w is a world 
according to which the actual Donald Trump is the US 
president in 2017’. (Modal constraint ) is straightforward: 
necessarily, if w is such that the actual Donald Trump is the 
US president in 2017, then w must be a world according to 
which there is a US president in 2017; moreover, from the 
fact that w is a world according to which there is a US 
president in 2017, it does not always follow that, according 
to w, the US president in 2017 is the actual Donald Trump. 
(Levels) also is satisfied, and it is the most interesting feature 
for – as we will see – is what makes the recarving operation 
possible. Let m be an effective subject matter and n a 
subject matter strictly included in m; it is easy to show that 
each m-cell is a determinable having as determinates all n-
cell that it strictly contains. Let m be the subject matter 
‘The hair of the US president in 2017’ and n the subject 
matter ‘The US president in 2017’; by a reasoning similar to 
the one previously given, it is possible to show that the 
property ‘w is a world according to which the object a is the 
hair of the US president in 2017’ is a determinable having 
of the property ‘w is a world according to which the object a 
is the hair of the actual Donald Trump’. 
The relation determinate-determinable may be 
reasonably taken also as a sufficient condition. To see this 
point it suffices to note that the way a set of determinates 
partitions  the domain under consideration defines a 
relation of partial indistinguishability with respect to the 
determinable15. Indeed, all red things are indistinguishable 
with respect to their color, as well as a red thing and a 
                                                     
15 A similar remark is made in (Armstrong, 1996), pp.51–55. 
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yellow thing are distinguishable – inter alia – under the same 
respect. As suggested by Lewis (1988), what I have called an 
effective subject matter has the characteristic feature of 
being defined by an equivalence relation that is a relation of 
partial indistinguishability under a fixed respect. 
Therefore the following criterion may be reasonably 
assumed: 
 
Criterion for effectiveness of a subject matter (CESM): 
 
Let m be a subject matter and W  be the set on which m is 
defined. The subject matter m is effective iff every m-cell is 
the extension of a determinate of a determinable having W 
as extension. 
 
Note that the fact that a subject matter m is effective 
does not imply that to each m-cell A corresponds an object 
existing in all worlds belonging to A that is a witness for 
every sentence exactly about m; it simply says that all worlds 
in A are indistinguishable with respect to m, not that they 
must have a part in common. 
The criterion (CESM) is used to determine when a 
certain partitioning of the logical space is an effective 
subject matter. Nonetheless, what we require to perform a 
recarving operation is something more: given a sentence 
and its exact subject matter, we want a procedure that 
determines a new effective subject matter strictly included 
in the initial one; or at least, we want a procedure that 
determines a certain range of effective smaller subject 
matters. 
As previously mentioned, we may do this according to a 
certain pattern of resemblances between the witnesses of 
the given sentence, a pattern that must display a certain sort 
of relevance with what the sentence says about its exact 
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subject matter. In the following we will see how to define 
this pattern. 
Let S be the sentence ‘The US president in 2017 is 
blond’ and let m be its exact subject matter ‘The US 
president in 2017’. As briefly mentioned in section 3, we 
may represent the intension CS of S as obtained by a 
functional composition between the subject matter 
function m and the truth-function FS representing the 
condition in the way S carves up its content, i.e 
for all w ∈ W, CS (w) = FS (m(w)) 
where FS may be seen as the function that, for every 
object x, FS(x) is the value ‘True’ iff x is blond, and m is the 
function that associates to every possible world w the 
witness of S in w. 
Again, we may use the relation of determination 
between properties to define the pattern of resemblances 
and to grant that the new restricted subject matter is an 
effective one. Let US be the set of all witnesses of S; under 
the assumption that there is a determinable property P 
shared by all witnesses in US, we may say that two witnesses 
stand in the required resemblance relation iff they have the 
same determinate of P . Moreover, we must require that the 
resemblance relation is relevant to what S says about m; 
thus we add the following condition: for every two 
witnesses of S u and v, and for every determinate X of P , if 
u and v both have X, then FS(u) = FS(u), namely, if two 
witnesses stand in the relation of resemblance defined by 
the determination of P , then either both witness the truth of 
S or both its falsity (either both are ways of being true of S, 
or both are ways of being false). With reference to the 
considered example, the determinable property may be ‘x is 
not bald’ and each determinate may be ‘x has hair so-and-so’ 
(for sake of simplicity we suppose that there are no possible 
bald US presidents in 2017); it follows that two possible US 
presidents in 2017 stand in the suitable relation of 
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resemblance iff they are indistinguishable with respect to 
their hairs; and if two possible US presidents in 2017 are 
indistinguishable with respect to their hairs, then it is 
impossible that one is blond while the other is not. 
We may define the following criterion based in a pattern 
of resemblance as previously defined: 
 
Good recarvings (GR) 
Let S be a sentence exactly about m, and let US be the set of 
witnesses of S. Let Σ be an operation of subject matter 
restriction, such that Σ(m)= n with n strictly included in m. 
We say that Σ is a good candidate for content recarving iff there is 
an intrinsic determinable property P shared by all witnesses 
in US whose class of intrinsic determinates ∆(US) satisfies 
the following: 
 
i. For every two possible worlds w1, w2 and for 
every X in ∆(US), both m(w1) and m(w2) have X iff w1 
and w2 belong to the same n-cell, 
 
ii. For every two possible worlds w1, w2 and for 
every X in ∆(US), if m(w1) and m(w2) have X, then the 
truth-value of S in w1 is identical to the truth-value of 
S in w2 . 
 
The criterion (GR) may be seen as suggesting how to 
define the new restricted subject matter by merging the cells 
of the initial subject matter once that a range of determinate 
properties of a certain determinable is given. Indeed, 
according to condition (i), whenever two witnesses of S 
have the same determinate, we must merge their 
corresponding m-cells. Condition (ii) ensures the relevance 
of the pattern of resemblances: two witnesses that have the 
same determinate must be either both ways of being true of 
S or both ways of being false of S. Note the difference 
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between (CESM) and (GR): while the former is framed in 
terms of the relation of determination between properties of 
possible worlds, the latter is framed in terms of the relation 
of determination between properties of witnesses. 
How (GR) is supposed to grant that the resulting 
subject matter n is an effective one? The answer is almost 
immediate: to say that two witnesses of S have the same 
determinate is just to say that they are indistinguishable 
under a fixed respect; as a consequence, all worlds in which 
these witnesses exist are also indistinguishable under the 
same fixed respect. In other words, the relation of 
determination between intrinsic properties of the witnesses 
of a given sentence is transmitted between corresponding 
properties of possible worlds, and – by (CESM) – the new 
subject matter is effective. 
To use the relation of determination between properties 
to define a good candidate operation for content recarving 
appears to be an illuminating improvement on the 
definition of the previous section: content recarving is not 
just a subject matter restriction, yet a restriction that has 
been characterized as a relevant specification; of all subject 
matters strictly included in the initial one, the operation of 
content recarving should pick out only those that represent 
a further determination of what the given sentence says 
about its subject matter. For this reason, we cannot perform 
a recarving of the sentence ‘The US president in 2017 is 
blond’ by restricting the subject matter to ‘The left hand of 
the US president in 2017’: for there are possible US 
presidents in 2017 that are indistinguishable with respect to 
their left hands while being distinguishable with respect to 
their blondness; what the sentence says about the US 
president in 2017 has nothing to do with the his/her left 
hand. Nor we may perform the recarving by an arbitrary 
subpartitioning of the initial subject matter, for what grants 
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that worlds belonging to the same new cell really are 
indistinguishable under a certain respect? 
What such an improved account of content recarving 
has to say regarding abstraction principles? Consider the 
case of Hume’s Principle: ‘The number of stars = the 
number of planets’ is expected to be the recarving of ‘There 
are as many stars as planets’. The latter sentence is exactly 
about the concept of star, the concept of planet . Each cell in which 
this subject matter partitions the logical space, corresponds 
to worlds agreeing on all instances of the concept of star 
and that of planet. Consider the property ‘The concept X is 
n-instantiated’: for every finite cardinal n, it is well known 
that such a property may be defined without mentioning 
cardinal numbers, but relying only on a suitable use of 
quantifiers of the form ∃ nx Xx. This second-order 
property may be seen as an intrinsic determinate of the 
second-order determinable ‘X  is instantiated’.  The list of 
all  second-order properties ¬∃ xXx , ∃ 1xXx, ∃ 2xXx, ...  , 
∃ nxXx, ..., may be considered as the class of determinates 
defining our pattern of resemblances according to the 
criterion (GR). Call this class C#; we will define the relation 
of C#-similarity, i.e. our relation of resemblance between 
two pairs of extension of respectively the concept of star 
and the concept of planet: for any two possible worlds w1, 
w2, the pair of extensions of the concept of star and the 
concept of planet at w1 is C#-similar to the pair of 
extensions of the concept of star and the concept of planet 
at w2 iff the extensions of the concept of star at w1 and w2 
have the same determinate in C# and the same happens 
with the pair of extensions of the concept of planet. 
The relation of C#-similarity may be used to define a 
new equivalence relation ≡#  on possible worlds:  for any 
two worlds w1, w2 ∈  W, w1 ≡# w2 iff the pair composed by 
the extension of the concept of star in w1  and extension of 
the concept  of planet in w1 is C#- similar to the pair
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 composed by the extension of the concept of star in w2 
and the extension of the concept of planet in w2. The 
relation ≡# defines the new subject matter strictly included 
in the concept of star, the concept of planet . It should appear clear 
what this new subject matter is: 
⟨ #( the concept of star), #(the concept of planet) ⟩ 
where the symbol # has been used to abbreviate the 
expression ‘the cardinal number of ’. This result shows that it is 
possible – by an application of the recarving operation 
according to a certain pattern of resemblances – to restrict 
the subject matter of a sentence saying that two concepts 
are equinumerous so that  a new subject matter , the 
cardinal numbers of the two concepts at issue, is 
determined. Moreover, by (GR), the new subject matter is 
an effective one, for it is defined according to a relation of 
determination between higher-order properties. What is still 
missing is a way of deciding whether there is a sentence 
exactly about the restricted subject matter or not. In other 
words, what is needed is a criterion for saying that the new 
cells in which the logical space has been partitioned may be 
associated with ways of being true (false) of a certain 
sentence, i.e. with existing entities.   This takes us to the 
second problem related to the definition of a non-arbitrary 
recarving operation. The discussion that follows, though 
being focused on Hume’s Principle, is applicable to all cases 
of abstraction principles. 
The given definition of content recarving and the 
described procedure of the determination of the restricted 
subject matter according to a pattern of resemblance, allow 
us to classify the possible scenarios in three cases: 
 
1. Even if the subject matter cardinal number may be 
determined according to the described procedure, 
there is no sentence exactly about it, i.e. the cells 
determined by the subject matter cardinal number 
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cannot be associated with ways of being true (false) 
of a certain sentence, simply because the objects that 
should play the role of witnesses of such a sentence 
(i.e. the cardinal numbers) do not exist in all possible 
worlds. Verdict: cardinal number is an effective subject 
matter, it is not an exact subject matter of a certain 
sentence, and there are numberless worlds. 
 
2. Cardinal number is a subject matter and the 
sentence ‘The number of stars = the number of 
planets’ is exactly about cardinal numbers. Yet a 
difference in the way this sentence is true (false) may 
be explained without appealing to cardinal numbers 
as objects existing in every possible worlds. Verdict: 
cardinal number is an effective subject matter, it 
corresponds to the exact subject matter of a certain 
class of sentences, yet there are numberless worlds. 
 
3. Cardinal number is a subject matter and the 
sentence ‘The number of stars = the number of 
planets’ is exactly about cardinal numbers. The way 
this sentence is true or false is characterized in terms 
of the objects corresponding to the cardinal number 
of stars and that of planets; in other words, cardinal 
numbers as objects are the witnesses of the sentence 
‘The number of stars = the number of planets’. 
Verdict: cardinal number is an effective subject matter, 
it corresponds to the exact subject matter of a 
certain class of sentences, and there are cardinal 
numbers in every possible world. 
 
All cases agree on the fact that cardinal number is an 
effective subject matter: sentences may be about cardinal 
numbers in a genuine sense. For instance, the sentence 
‘There are as many stars as planets’ is about both the 
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number of stars and the number of planets, for this latter 
subject matter is effective and included into the exact 
subject matter of the sentence.  Clearly,  ‘There are as many 
stars  as planets’ is not exactly about cardinal numbers: for 
cardinal numbers are not crucial for the determination of 
the ways in which the sentence may be true or false. Case 1 
is the only case of rejection of the fact that ‘The number of 
stars = the number of planets’ is the result of recarving the 
content of ‘There are as many stars as planets’: for the 
former sentence cannot be exactly about the restricted 
subject matter determined by the described procedure. Case 
2 and 3 present an agreement on the fact that the sentence 
of number identity is a recarving of the sentence of 
equinumerousity between two concepts. Case 3 accepts the 
recarving in the most straightforward way: a sentence 
exactly about  cardinal  numbers  is  made  true or false by the 
objects corresponding to the cardinal numbers at issue.   
Case 2   is more complicated, yet far more interesting: it 
contemplates the possibility of formulating sentences 
exactly about cardinal numbers which do not require the 
necessary existence of them as objects. How this could be 
possible? How the notion of exact subject matter may be 
characterized without the relation between ways of being 
true/false and existing verifiers/falsifiers? A preliminary 
answer could be that the ways in which the sentence ‘The 
number of stars = the number of planets’ is true may be 
characterized pragmatically; for instance, we may agree on a 
conventional procedure-type of cardinal number 
assignment, e.g. counting, and we may establish the validity 
of such procedures even in possible worlds in which there 
are no beings able to count. Another possible answer uses 
the notion of the best world when a certain subject matter is 
concerned. The sentence ‘The number of stars = the number 
of planets’ is true (false) in a certain possible world w 
precisely in the way in which it is true (false) in all worlds 
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belonging to the same cardinal number-partition that are most 
adequate to the subject matter cardinal number: and these 
worlds are all worlds in which cardinal numbers exist16. 
There is much more to say about the ontological import 
of the operation of content recarving; yet disputing the 
details of this issue will take us too faraway. What matters 
for the present discussion is the fact that the recarving 
operation may be characterized as a restriction of subject 
matter where the restriction is intended as a specification 
relevant to what the sentence to be recarved says about its 
exact subject matter. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
I have proposed that the operation of carving up a 
content expressed by a sentence φ may be conceived as the 
partitioning of the bilateral proposition expressed by φ 
according to the exact subject matter of φ; moreover, I have 
proposed that the recarving of a content already carved up 
by a sentence φ may be seen as an operation that restricts 
the given subject matter in accordance with what φ says 
about its subject matter. Such a notion of restriction in 
accordance with what φ says about its subject matter has 
been characterized in terms of the relation of determination 
between properties; the resulting account proposes content 
recarving as an operation of subject matter restriction, 
where restriction is intended as a relevant specification. 
As I hope, this proposal clarifies the apparently 
mysterious procedure described in §64 of the Foundations of 
Arithmetic: the application of the specific content of the 
symbol ‘ǁ’ to a and b is interpreted as the restriction of the 
                                                     
16 Both the pragmatic answer and the best world answer are 
suggested by Yablo (2014), p.36 
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subject matter
 
(i.e. line a, line b) to the aspect most relevant 
to what 'a ǁ b' says about it: directions. As a result of this 
restriction of subject matter, the new condition applied to 
the new subject matter has to be more general, and in this 
respect I also hope to have clarified what is the result of 
“removing what is specific in the content of ”. 
The proposal has the advantage of explaining the 
operation of content recarving using a philosophically 
significant notion – that of subject matter – with reference 
to a robust theoretical characterization of this notion 
(Lewis-Yablo theory of subject matter). 
The fact that the proposal presents several limitations 
insofar as it is neither  a proper interpretation of Frege’s 
view nor a characterization within Frege’s conceptual 
universe, has the advantage of resulting more general in its 
applications: indeed, the described recarving operation is 
not limited to the case of abstraction principles. 
There are two main possible future works stemming 
from the given characterization. The first one is the analysis 
of other abstraction principles: the outcome of such an 
analysis is that some abstraction principles may not be 
considered as obtained by content recarving, for they may 
not perform an effective subject matter restriction. The 
second one concerns the relation between mathematical 
language and subject matter: arithmetical statements, when 
conceived as obtained by a recarving operation, may be seen 
as sentences that while succeeding in being about 
mathematical notions, are not committed to the existence of 
mathematical objects. 
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